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Towards the Safety of Human-in-the-Loop Robotics:
Challenges and Opportunities for Safety Assurance of Robotic Co-Workers∗
Kerstin Eder1, Chris Harper2 and Ute Leonards3
Abstract— The success of the human-robot co-worker team in
a flexible manufacturing environment where robots learn from
demonstration heavily relies on the correct and safe operation
of the robot. How this can be achieved is a challenge that
requires addressing both technical as well as human-centric
research questions. In this paper we discuss the state of the art
in safety assurance, existing as well as emerging standards in
this area, and the need for new approaches to safety assurance
in the context of learning machines. We then focus on robotic
learning from demonstration, the challenges these techniques
pose to safety assurance and outline opportunities to integrate
safety considerations into algorithms “by design”. Finally, from
a human-centric perspective, we stipulate that, to achieve high
levels of safety and ultimately trust, the robotic co-worker must
meet the innate expectations of the humans it works with. It is
our aim to stimulate a discussion focused on the safety aspects
of human-in-the-loop robotics, and to foster multidisciplinary
collaboration to address the research challenges identified.
I. INTRODUCTION
Robotic co-workers are machines designed to support
flexible manufacturing in collaboration with humans. They
complement the skills and cognitive abilities that enable
humans to accomplish frequently changing, varied or impre-
cise tasks, with strength, precision, endurance and limitless
capacity for repetition. These robots are expected to provide
assistance for a wide variety of tasks. To reduce or even
eliminate the effort involved with frequently re-programming
robots so that they can perform new tasks, techniques that
enable robot learning from demonstration are now being
developed [1]. Such techniques empower non-experts to
teach or train robots, e.g. how to be most useful within a
flexible manufacturing environment.
Flexible manufacturing requires robotic co-workers to act
within the personal space of a human. They may be involved
in shared manipulation of objects and even make direct
contact with their human operators. To be genuinely useful,
some robots may need to be powerful and therefore are
potentially dangerous. Safety of the humans that interact with
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these machines is clearly a prime concern in these settings.
The introduction of learning from demonstration techniques
further emphasizes the need to ensure the safety of human
operators, both during the learning phase and also afterwards,
when the newly acquired task is being performed by the
robot. The safe operation of the robotic co-workers is a core
foundation for humans to establish trust in them.
In this paper we investigate issues surrounding safety
assurance of robotic co-workers. We start from a technical,
robot-centric angle by considering safety assurance and certi-
fication requirements currently under development for robots
that work in direct interaction with humans in shared spaces.
We show that there is a considerable gap to bridge, and
hence a research challenge associated with safety assurance
of robots that flexibly learn new tasks “on the fly”. We
review proposals to shift parts of safety assurance from
design time to runtime, and investigate the feasibility of using
similar techniques to achieve safety assurance for robotic co-
workers. We then focus on robot “learning from demonstra-
tion” techniques, in particular on reinforcement learning, and
illustrate both the opportunities arising from humans in the
loop, as well as the dangers and the associated responsibility
to ensure the safety of the human operators. We aim to
identify opportunities to integrate safety considerations into
the design of robotic co-workers, i.e. into the embedded
learning algorithms from the beginning “by design”.
Our discussion then takes a human-centric view and
focuses on the psychological challenges associated with
human-robot co-worker teams. We stipulate that, to achieve
high levels of safety and ultimately trust, the robotic co-
worker must meet the innate expectations of the humans it
works with. For instance, if a co-worker robot were to be
equipped with head and eyes, it would be expected to use
eye gaze as warning signal in case of danger by directing
gaze toward the source of danger. Also, in a shared activity,
gaze would be expected to be directed to the task at hand in
line with human expectations on the focus of attention. This
requires deep understanding of the signals sent by humans
and the way humans interpret these signals when observed
in human co-workers.
With this position paper we aim to stimulate a discussion
focused on safety aspects of robotic co-workers, both from
a robot design as well as from a human-centric perspective.
Our paper poses more research questions than it provides
answers. These questions, however, are designed to open
up an opportunity for the research community to address
safety “by design”. This is both a timely as well as a
necessary endeavour, because any techniques that are to be
used in practice will need to be demonstrably safe, and, most
importantly, will need to be accepted by humans, i.e. they
need to gain the trust of the humans who work with them.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II is focused on
safety assurance; it presents insights into existing and forth-
coming standards covering the safety of robotic co-workers.
Section III investigates robotic learning from demonstration,
and we identify opportunities and challenges to integrate
safety “by design”. Section IV considers the psychological
challenges associated with human-robot co-worker teams.
Finally, Section V summarizes and concludes.
II. ASSURANCE AS A FOUNDATION FOR TRUST
A. Existing and forthcoming standards for safety assurance
The success of a human-robot co-worker team heavily
relies on the dependability of the robot. Dependability has
been defined as “the ability to deliver a service that can
justifiably be trusted” [2]. Dependability is an over-arching
concept that includes attributes such as safety, availability,
reliability, predictability, integrity and maintainability. Safety
is a critical aspect of dependability, which traditionally is
assured prior to a system’s deployment. Safety assurance
assesses the absence of harmful consequences of a system’s
actions (or non-action) on users and the environment.
A key property of dependability assurance is that it is
a subjective condition of a system’s users as well as an
objective property of the system itself. Even if a system
design contains no flaws and its operation never causes
harm throughout its life, if its users cannot be assured of
this before they start to use the system, then they may not
trust the system and thus may never use it. Therefore, the
art of designing dependable systems is not only to create
a flawless design, but to do so in a manner that permits
such flawlessness to be demonstrated. This requires careful
choices of a system’s architecture and mechanisms, because
only those technologies whose correct operation can be easily
verified and validated are suitable for such applications.
Until recently, the practical deployment of robotic assis-
tants has been held back by the lack of credible standards
and techniques for safety assurance. In traditional robotic
applications, safety has been achieved by confining robots to
closed workplaces from which humans are isolated. Safety
is assured by demonstrating that the isolation is effective,
rather than by demonstrating the safety of the technology of
the robot; the former is usually a much easier problem to
solve. Consequently, safety is not an essential aspect of such
robots’ operations, and performance is the key objective.
Robotic co-workers, however, are designed to assist hu-
mans in their work within the same workplace. It is inherent
to their purpose that they cannot be isolated from the people
they are intended to assist. Collaborative operation, however,
in particular in a shared space, is a much more complex
problem to assure and requires more extensive assessment
of the technology of a robot and its surroundings than was
necessary in more traditional applications.
Robots are expected to be safety-certified when enter-
ing the market, which provides assurance that deploying
a system does not pose an unacceptable risk of adverse
consequences. Industry standards for collaborative operation
in robots are currently the focus of extensive study in the
major international standards agencies. The Technical Com-
mittee (TC) 184, Sub-Committee (SC) 2 of the International
Standards Organization (ISO) develops standards for robots
and robotic devices, and currently has working groups cov-
ering industrial, medical, and service robots. Working Group
(WG) 7 has developed the ISO 13482 safety requirements
standard for service robots, including physical assistance and
mobile servant applications, and WG3 of the same committee
is developing a Technical Specification (TS) 15066 focused
on collaborative robots. TS15066 provides guidance on col-
laborative operation for industrial applications, including the
specification of several collaborative modes of operation and
their associated safety requirements.
Central to the guidelines in TS15066 are hazard identifica-
tion and risk assessment. Both are performed by experts and
are specific to the collaborative task shared between a robot
and its human operator. Thus, task identification is key to
the correct determination of any foreseeable hazards. Risk
assessment is then performed on these hazards, including
the identification of values such as the maximum allowable
speed of movement for the robot and the minimum separation
distance between robot and human, either as static values
or as dynamic ranges. Based on the risk assessment, risk
reduction strategies can be implemented for hazards where
the risk of harm is seen to be unacceptably high.
Because the traditional approach of risk reduction by
separation of the human from the robot cannot be used for
collaborative settings, the focus of the guidelines in TS15066
is on influencing the design of the robot, the joint workplace
and the collaborative task itself, to include protective mea-
sures that ensure the safety of human operators. This may
include re-design of tools and work pieces, e.g. to achieve
smooth, but not sharp, surfaces and low weights, both of
which influence the impact force in hazardous situations
caused by direct contact with humans. To continuously track
the position of humans within the collaborative workplace, a
speed and separation monitoring system is essential. Where
hazards arise out of direct contact with human operators,
whether intended or unintended, a fast contact detection
system must be in place to feed into a safety-related control
system. This system must be capable of processing context-
related information in real time and to activate protective
measures when this becomes necessary. These are examples
of runtime monitors and an important part of safety assurance
at runtime, as we will see in the next section.
The impact force of dynamic contact and its duration, as
well as the location (body region) of such contact—all key
parameters for safety assessment—can vary greatly between
collaborative tasks and, in particular, from human to human,
even when restricting human-robot collaboration to shared
workplaces within a flexible manufacturing environment.
This severely restricts the generality of calculations, as,
in principle, human-specific information is required. It is
still to be determined how this problem of person-specific
characterization can be addressed. Potentially, a “calibration”
phase may be required before operation starts, so that the
robot co-worker can be customized to fit its human operator.
The ISO TS 15066 is expected to be publicly released
later this year. It promotes a task-specific approach to safety
assurance that requires the hardware and software, the work
environment and task specification to be available for hazard
analysis and risk assessment in their final, fully finished
forms prior to the deployment of the collaborative robotic
system. Furthermore, it is based on the assumption that it is
possible to predict as well as counter all hazardous operation
conditions prior to system deployment. This appears to be
inherently at odds with the concept of teaching robots new
tasks “on the fly”, which leaves the task identification,
definition and training to the human operator, whose safety is
of paramount importance. Hence, each newly learnt task, and
also the learning process itself, must be safety assured. Thus,
for any learning from demonstration technique to become
viable in practice, safety must be an integral part of the learn-
ing process, directly embedded into the learning algorithms.
Task-specific safety assurance, consequently, may need to be
shifted to runtime, at least in part.
B. Assurance at runtime
A case for “Just-in-Time Certification” of adaptive systems
has been made in [3]. Traditional assurance methods are
based on the assumption that, prior to deployment of a
system, the system is available in its final, fully finished form
for safety assessment, and that all operating conditions that
the system will face while interacting with its environment
can be predicted and analyzed upfront. Adaptive systems,
however, are designed to modify their behaviour at runtime
in response to changes in their environment or in the system
itself. Such systems simply do not meet the assumptions on
which traditional certification methods are based, because
the time at which the behaviour of the system is finalized
is shifted from system design to system deployment. This
impacts on the time at which certification can be performed;
it leaves at least part of the certification process to be
completed at runtime. Adaptive systems, therefore, call for
the development of novel approaches to certification, not to
replace traditional approaches, but to complement these with
techniques that can be used at runtime.
Robots that learn from demonstration are adaptive sys-
tems. They learn new tasks at runtime. The fact that a
human is involved in the training as well as in the collab-
orative execution of the task is associated with benefits and
challenges with respect to safety aspects. On one side, the
human operator can influence learning so that the learning
result complies with safety requirements. On the other side,
however, the human operator is exposed to potential hazards
during the learning process; this creates the obligation to
protect her/him from these. Can “just-in-time” techniques
support safety assurance in our context?
The provocatively named “just-in-time” certification ap-
proach proposed in [3] is firmly based on the use of formal
methods, at design time and at runtime. It takes advantage of
the observation that, if the behaviour of a system was fixed at
design time, then safety assessment would focus on the pre-
defined behaviour and determine whether its characteristics
meet a set of pre-defined safety requirements. If the checking
step could be automated, then its execution could reasonably
be shifted to runtime. This, of course, necessitates encod-
ing the safety requirements in a suitable form for runtime
monitoring, e.g. as a model or a protocol to be adhered to.
A monitor can then be formally derived from the model
or protocol. At runtime, this monitor continuously checks
compliance with the safety requirements, and prevents any
behaviour that causes violations. While, traditionally, such
monitors are generated at design time and applied at runtime,
the use of Runtime Verification techniques1 enables the gen-
eration of such monitors at runtime, based on explicit models
that capture the generic behaviour of system components and
the safety requirements that must be satisfied.
In a similar way, “learning from demonstration” ap-
proaches could be constrained at runtime, based on suit-
able models or protocols, to deliver only learning results
that are considered safe. Alternatively, or in addition, task-
specific safety monitors could be generated. These prevent
interactions which violate safety requirements at runtime.
It is worth noting that safety-related control systems are
already mentioned in the forthcoming standards for runtime
monitoring and potential intervention as briefly indicated in
Section II-A. In the next section we review “learning from
demonstration” techniques and investigate opportunities and
challenges to integrate safety assurance into the learning
algorithms by design, as well as options to shift part of safety
assurance to runtime.
III. OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTEGRATING SAFETY INTO
THE LEARNING FROM DEMONSTRATION PROCESS
A. Learning from Demonstration (LfD)
To perform a task, a sequence of actions is applied to a
given state of the world. Each individual action transforms
the world state; the final action should result in a state
that reflects the execution of the task. Finding an effective
sequence of actions, i.e. a policy, to achieve a target state is a
key challenge in robotics and automation. In “Learning from
Demonstration” (LfD) robots learn a new task by watching
the task being performed by a human or a robot teacher.
The observations gained from watching the task guide a
supervised learning process towards the development of a
policy that the robot learner can use to perform the task.
LfD offers an intuitive way for humans to communicate
with robots. It enables non-experts to teach robots new
skills by simply demonstrating these to the robot. In flexible
manufacturing, robotic assistants are used to support humans
during the execution of a large variety of different tasks,
each of which would normally require some level of re-
programming or re-setting the robot. With LfD techniques
this is not necessary, as new tasks are acquired by learning
from example demonstrations. As such, LfD techniques
1http://runtime-verification.org/
facilitate human-robot interaction and support more flexible
human-robot collaboration.
A variety of different machine learning techniques have
been used for LfD; a recent survey is contained in [1]. In
general, three core approaches for policy derivation can be
distinguished according to [1]:
a) those that learn directly how to map the robot’s state
observations to actions,
b) those that derive a policy based on learning a world
model and a reward function, and
c) those that learn a policy by planning based on se-
quences of actions and their pre- and post-conditions.
Irrespective of the learning approach, the challenge is to
ensure that safety is maintained during the learning process,
and that the learning result satisfies safety requirements “by
design”. This necessitates embedding safety considerations
directly into the learning algorithms. How this can be
achieved is a research question that needs to be addressed
before LfD can safely be deployed in practice.
The collaboration with robotic assistants is likely to
change the nature of the work, the tasks involved, and the
work environment [4]. For LfD it has been found that simple
imitation or mimicking of the demonstration is often not
sufficient for the robot to perform the task [5]. Instead,
the objective of the task that is being demonstrated must
be captured, so that a policy can be learnt that enables the
robot to achieve this objective. The actual behaviour of the
robot to realize its goal may differ from that demonstrated,
especially when the trainer is a human rather than another
robot. In [5] it was found that the robot’s hand motion in
a simple pendulum swing up task was quite different from
the motion recorded for the human demonstrator due to
differences in gripping technique and hand structure, which
result in different task dynamics. In general, the bigger the
physical differences between trainers and learners, the more
likely it is that the learnt behaviour differs, although it
achieves the same objective. This is an important finding and
likely to be problematic in the context of safety assurance,
which is task specific, as described in Section II-A. Even if
the actions performed in a task demonstration satisfy safety
requirements, the safety assessment may need to be repeated
for the learning result, because the dynamics of the learnt
task may differ enough from that of the demonstration for
the original safety assessment to no longer hold.
The LfD approach in [5] provides a good example to
illustrate how safety may be integrated into a model-based
planning algorithm in the form of constraints that capture
pre-determined safety requirements. The existing planner
aims to find a policy that the robot can use to accomplish the
target task. Amongst all the possible policies, the ones that
satisfy the relevant safety constraints are desirable. While in-
cluding safety constraints into planning clearly increases the
complexity of the learning task, this is necessary to ensure
that the learning outcome complies with safety requirements.
In [5] it has been shown that learning performance can
be significantly increased when background knowledge is
provided in the form of models that capture the physics of
the task to be learnt. If the physical characteristics of a task
are known upfront, could safety requirements be attached
to these models to guide the learning towards safe policies?
Could these enriched models then serve as the basis for the
generation of runtime safety monitors?
B. LfD with Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement Learning [6] is a widely used LfD tech-
nique [1] and a good example to illustrate the potential
problems arising when robots learn new tasks “on the fly”.
The interesting feature of Reinforcement Learning is that
policy development is guided by feedback given to the robot
during explorative learning. Feedback is provided in the form
of a function that rewards desirable and penalizes undesirable
actions. Learners aim to maximise their cumulative reward.
Based on the feedback, the robot learns which actions or
sequences of actions are preferable to achieve a target goal.
Thus, in Reinforcement Learning, policy development neces-
sitates performing desirable as well as undesirable actions.
This can result in robots violating safety requirements while
learning new tasks. In an environment that requires close
collaboration with humans also during the learning stage,
this cannot be tolerated. Clearly, human operators need to
be protected not only during the joint task execution in
collaboration with a robot, but also during task transfer, i.e.
during the LfD process.
An adaptation of Reinforcement Learning that includes
future directed rewards in the form of interactive guidance
given by humans during the learning process has been
presented in [7]. The resulting learning system can dy-
namically switch between explorative and guidance-based
learning. This has been achieved by modifying the learning
algorithm so that it accepts guidance when it is available;
if not, then the algorithm works by randomly selecting
actions and observing the associated reward. Guidance is
given by a human teacher who constrains the robot’s action
selection, e.g. by focusing on a particular object, the explo-
rative learning is being restricted to the smaller and more
relevant set of actions related to that object. The result is
a more rational choice of actions compared to the random
action selection that would be made by algorithms without
guidance. The benefits include, amongst others, improved
learning performance and a decreased number of failed trails.
This leads to more understandable behaviour of the learner
and a more fulfilling experience for the human teacher.
It seems plausible that a similar approach could be used
to achieve both, safety of the learning process and of the
learning result, by biasing action selection to those actions
that satisfy safety requirements. To achieve this, a method
needs to be found to formalize safety requirements as high-
level policies that can guide learning.
C. Virtual and mixed reality environments for LfD
It has been proposed to transfer LfD into virtual envi-
ronments to reduce the time, labour and cost of real-world
development methods [8]. Virtual environments would also
make the LfD considerably safer for human operators. In [8]
modelling first creates a virtual agent, termed the “virtual
human”, who takes the role of the human in LfD within a
virtual environment. The virtual human is controlled by a
human operator to learn a human behavioural model which
serves as a basis for executing actions during the demon-
stration part of the learning. Another virtual agent, termed
the “virtual learner”, observes the virtual human’s actions
in order to learn behaviours that enable it to collaborate
with the human. This phase of the learning process is called
“behavioural learning”. In the second learning phase, the
“collaborative learning”, the virtual learner then learns how
to collaborate with the virtual human. Finally, once learning
has been accomplished in the virtual environment, the results
can be transferred to a real robot or a software agent.
Safety compliance could reasonably be evaluated, at least
in a first instance, in such a virtual setting. Only those
learning results that have passed safety assessment in the
virtual environment would then be applied to the real robot.
Of course, this necessitates a sufficiently accurate model
not only of the human and the robot learner, but also of
the environment in which the interaction will take place,
i.e. the collaborative workplace. The major shortfall of the
approach described in [8] is that it does not generalize to
complex real world scenarios, where interaction is required
with different humans. As it stands, multiple humans would
need to be modelled and behaviour as well as collaborative
learning would need to be repeated for each human model.
The challenges of accommodating variability, both between
multiple demonstrations of a task by the same operator,
and between demonstrations of the same task by different
operators, need to be addressed to develop a more generic
approach to LfD, not only in virtual environments.
In [9] mixed-reality testbeds are used to support incre-
mental development of systems that involve humans, robots
and software agents with the goal to reduce costs and
risks compared to testing in a real-world environment. The
operation of these systems depends on a variety of factors,
including, but not limited to, those of the robot hardware, e.g.
the characteristics of the sensors and actuators, the features of
the environment, e.g. the collaborative workplace including
tools and materials, and, most importantly, the behaviour of
the human operators, resulting in a complex test environment
overall. To facilitate early and fast validation, the components
in the physical test environment can be replaced by virtual
models in incremental steps, either fully or partially. The
resulting mixed-reality, multi-level testbed integrates models
of different fidelity and size, so that validation can be per-
formed at the level of abstraction that delivers the accuracy
appropriate for the respective test objective.
The degree of virtualization ranges from full virtualization
of all system components, as described in [8], to mixed-
reality settings where different system components are vir-
tualized to different degrees. The latter include hardware-in-
the-loop simulation environments to increase the fidelity of
the hardware components in the testbed, as well as human-in-
the-loop virtual environments where human operators work
in a virtual reality setting so that the aspects of human
behaviour that are difficult (if not impossible) to capture with
virtual models become an integral part of the testbed.
In the context of human-robot collaborative manufactur-
ing, the fluctuations of human performance due to factors
such as fatigue, stress, lack of attention or concentration
could thus be determined, and their effects assessed, without
exposing the human operator to the risks inherent in testing
these in the physical environment. Could learning from
demonstration be entirely shifted to virtual or mixed reality
environments to protect human operators during learning?
Many LfD techniques assume that for each action a well
defined, deterministic state transformation can be specified,
and that all system states are known and thus can be defined
upfront [1]. This almost certainly does not hold for real
world settings, especially those involving humans. In the next
section we take a human-centric view on these aspects.
IV. HUMAN FACTORS
Humans have evolved as social animals over thousands
of years. They are highly sensitive to signals sent by other
humans such as in collaborative tasks [10]. Any movement
observed from another agent (evolutionarily another human
or an animal) will not only be interpreted to have a purpose,
but to be context-dependent and meaningful [11]. For exam-
ple, the speed with which a person hands over an object to
another person will vary depending on the physical abilities
of the two people involved in the interaction (e.g. an adult
handing over a cup to a small child or to another adult),
the type of object (e.g. a glass of water or a hot bowl of
soup), and their intent (e.g. slow movements might be a
warning to the other person to be careful when taking the
object, but could also indicate reluctance to let go of it).
Therefore, humans will usually rely on the context they are
in and accompany their interactions with a range of (mostly
nonverbal) signals (such as eye gaze or facial expressions,
body posture) with the consequence of disambiguating their
intentions. Humans tend to anthropomorphise moving agents
that are (seemingly) able to adapt their behaviour in a
dynamic way and attribute to them social cognitive abilities
of their own [12]. This creates an intuitive expectation in
the human about the behaviour of such agents, which can be
modulated only by experience.
Imagine a very simple scenario in which a robot repeatedly
performs a single task which is highly predictable in its order
of events, but requires the robot to move within an arm’s
reach of the human (e.g. the robot picks up an object from
a conveyor belt and holds it for the human to work on). To
make both the robot’s and the human’s tasks efficient and
to avoid collision between the human’s arm or hand and the
robot itself, both human and robotic movements need to be
exactly orchestrated [13]. This entails the implementation of
a cognitive model of human action in the robot that monitors
and predicts human action at a very short time scale, includ-
ing human inter- and intra-individual movement variability
as well as cognitive performance inconsistencies that are de-
pendent on individual factors such as fluid intelligence [14],
[15]. Measures of intra-individual movement variability on a
longer time scale such as variability induced by fatigue are
already widely used in Human Factors (e.g. heart rate [16],
[17], alpha frequencies in electroencephalography to detect
drowsiness [18], [19].
Less common psychophysiological methods would be re-
quired to provide the robot with dynamic information on a far
shorter time scale, such as tracking eye gaze to continuously
monitor the human’s focus of attention [20] and predict mind
wandering [21], or 3D motion capture information to track
the human’s arm movements [22]. Models on Joint Action
Understanding in humans [10] might give a first idea about
the cognitive architecture necessary within the robot.
Safety solutions to certification of specific robotic tasks
for HRI as given in the above scenario might seem complex
and require a range of control mechanisms, all regulating
and controlling the human’s behaviour. However, they can,
to large extents, rely on the inclusion of already existing
technology and methodology in Human Factors.
Imagine next a situation in which the robot selects between
different tasks depending on the context and is therefore
not 100% predictable at all times. This forces the human
to deal with uncertainty about the robot’s next actions.
In such a scenario, it becomes even more important for
the robot to send effortlessly understandable signals that
disambiguate its actions for the human. This enables the
human to maintain a sufficient level of awareness of the state
and actions of the robot. In fact, transparency together with
control have been found to be more important to human
operators than increased autonomy [23]. This is because,
as the complexity of the jointly performed task grows, so
does the importance of addressing mutual dependence to
sustain team performance and the necessary level of safety.
Increased autonomy without addressing interdependence has
been shown to result in sub-optimal performance [23].
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Assurance methods have evolved over time, from isola-
tion of humans from robots, to a task-based approach in
the forthcoming technical specification, TS 15066. There
is, however, still a long way to go to establish assurance
methods for systems that acquire new behaviour at runtime,
such as robotic co-workers that learn from demonstration.
We propose that the question of safety needs to be
addressed as an integral part of the very process of teaching
the robotic co-worker, and have highlighted opportunities to
extend existing LfD techniques accordingly. Furthermore, to
achieve high levels of safety and ultimately trust, the robotic
co-worker must meet the innate expectations of the humans
it works with. This necessitates equipping robotic co-workers
with a cognitive model of human action and the ability to
clearly communicate their intentions to human operators in
a timely manner.
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